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Abstract
The most influential approach of corporate governance, the view of shareholders supremacy
does not take into consideration that the key task of modern corporations is to generate and
transfer firm-specific knowledge. It proposes that, in order to overcome the widespread
corporate scandals, the interests of top management and directors should be increasingly
aligned to shareholder interests by making the board more responsible to shareholders, and
monitoring of top management by independent outside directors should be strengthened.
Corporate governance reform needs to go in another direction altogether. Firm-specific
knowledge investments are, like financial investments, not ex ante contractible, leaving
investors open to exploitation by shareholders. Employees therefore refuse to make firm-
specific investments. To gain a sustainable competitive advantage, there must be an incentive
to undertake such firm-specific investments. Three proposals are advanced to deal with this
dilemma: (1) The board should rely more on insiders. (2) The insiders should be elected by
those employees of the firm who are making firm-specific knowledge investments. (3) The
board should be chaired by a neutral person. These proposals have major advantages: they
provide incentives for knowledge investors; they countervail the dominance of executives;
they encourage intrinsic work motivation and loyalty to the firm by strengthening distributive
and procedural justice, and they ensure diversity on the board while lowering transaction
costs. These proposals for reforming the board may help to overcome the crisis corporate
governance is in. At the same time, they provide a step in the direction of a more adequate
theory of the firm as a basis for corporate governance.
(257 words)
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21. Introduction
Recent corporate scandals have turned the spotlight on corporate governance. Numerous
suggestions have been made to how the efficiency of the boards could be improved, but only
a few of these suggestions have taken into account what today is common understanding in
the strategic management literature, namely that the key task of firm governance is to
generate, accumulate, transfer and protect valuable knowledge and capability (e.g. Penrose,
1959; Rumelt, 1984; Grant, 1996; Teece et al., 1997; Kogut and Zander, 1996; Spender, 1996;
Foss and Foss, 2000; Grandori and Kogut, 2002). In particular the main approach in the
corporate governance discussion, the view of shareholder supremacy, disregards knowledge
work aspects. It has a marked influence on the present discussion, both in theory and practice
(Daily, Dalton and Canella, 2003). This approach contends that the key activity of boards is to
monitor management on behalf of shareholders. It does not differentiate between governing
the management of physical and knowledge work.
In the second section, we present various theoretical approaches to the theory of the firm
which underpin different suggestions for improving corporate governance: the traditional
view of the firm as a nexus of explicit contracts, the view of the firm as a nexus of firm-
specific investments and our view of the firm as a nexus of firm-specific knowledge
investments. We show that each approach leads to different conclusions with respect to
corporate governance and argue that the two first approaches have major shortcomings. In the
third section, we make our own suggestions for improving corporate governance. In the fourth
and fifth sections, we discuss arguments for and against our proposal. We conclude by stating
that corporate governance reform must be based on an adequate theory of the firm that
integrates theories of value generation and value distribution.
3 2. Alternative theoretical views on Corporate Governance
2.1 THE FIRM AS A NEXUS OF CONTRACTS
The dominant view of corporate governance is a particular application of agency and property
rights theory. It firstly assumes that shareholders should have supremacy and secondly that
there exists in the modern corporation a conflict of interest between shareholders as principals
and managers as agents. Though these assumptions do not necessarily follow from agency
and property rights theory (Grandori, 2004: 4), they are typically so stated in the corporate
governance literature (e.g. Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). They have been derived from the view
of the firm as a nexus of contracts (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).
The current main idea “official view of corporate governance” (Bechuk and Fried, 2005) is
that there exists a conflict of interest between managers (agents) and shareholders
(principals), caused by the separation of ownership and control in public corporations (Berle
and Means, 1932). In order to align their interests, the control of management must be
transferred to the board of directors as a second level of agency (e.g. Black, 1992). To achieve
better alignment of interests of directors and managers with those of shareholders the pay of
managers and directors should be tied to their performance and the independence of the board
should be strengthened (e.g. Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Jensen, 1993).
The wave of corporate scandals and the explosion of management compensation drew
attention to flaws in the corporate governance structure according to this “official view”. Even
its proponents now admit that the explosion of executives’ and directors’ pay has proven to be
‘managerial and organizational heroin’ (Jensen, Murphy and Wruck, 2004: 45). Critics speak
of ‘pay without performance’ (Bebchuk and Fried, 2004). In order to improve Corporate
Governance, mainly two measures have been discussed:
4Firstly, the board should become more independent of their CEOs in order to monitor them
more efficiently. The board should operate at arms’ length from the executives. As a result,
the board would be less inclined to tolerate the rent-seeking behavior of CEOs. Boards too
closely linked to executives hinder market forces, like the markets for capital, corporate
control and managerial labor, from imposing stringent constraints on managers. Rather, they
frequently see themselves as subordinates of the CEO. Therefore, the CEO should be the only
insider of the firm with board membership (Jensen, Murphy and Wruck, 2004: 55).
Secondly, the board should become more responsible to their shareholders. Board members
should be made more attentive to the shareholders’ interests. For instance, shareholders
should stand for annual election by the shareholders (Bebchuk and Fried, 2004).
The idea of board independence has been widely accepted but does not seem to contribute
much to solving the problem. Most importantly it has not led to pay moderation of CEOs and
other managers. The stronger dependency of directors on shareholders might even have fueled
the pay explosion, because in speculative markets it tends to align interests of CEOs to short-
term share price maximization (Bolton, Scheinkman and Xiong, in press).   In addition, a
meta-analysis of fifty-four studies on board dependence shows no statistical relationship
between board independence and firm financial performance (Dalton et al. 1998).
The conflict of interests between managers and shareholders discussed is based on the idea of
shareholders supremacy in the firm as a nexus of contracts. In this view, the firm is ‘a legal
fiction which serves as a focus for the complex process in which the conflicting objectives of
individuals … are brought in equilibrium within a framework of contractual relationship’
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976: 312). All possible conflicts between shareholders and other
stakeholders (including the employees) can be solved ex ante by contracts. Only shareholders
carry a residual risk and should therefore have residual ownership and control. As a
5consequence, directors should act solely in the interests of the shareholders, because it is not
possible to maximize more than one objective (Jensen, 2001).
 As the intensive recent discussion in the Journal of Management and Governance (Asher,
Mahoney and Mahoney, 2005; Blair, 2005; Grandori, 2005) demonstrates, belief in
shareholders supremacy is inadequate when it comes to carrying out a theoretical analysis of
today’s firms, which gain their competitive advantage through knowledge rather than physical
investments. It would be surprising if proposals derived from an inadequate theory could lead
to successful practical implications.
2.2. THE FIRM AS A NEXUS OF FIRM-SPECIFIC INVESTMENTS
The nexus of contract view is misleading and projects a legalistic picture of the firm
(Zingales, 2000). Although de jure equity is the only residual contract, de facto firms’
decisions have a strong impact on other members of the nexus, sometimes to an even greater
extent than shareholders’ decisions. This argument has been taken up by proponents of the
theory of incomplete contracts. They argue that shareholders’ supremacy is nevertheless
justified because they have fewer contractual safeguards than other stakeholders (Williamson,
1985). Hansmann (1996) argues that the costs of (external and internal) decision-making
between different stakeholders should be taken into account. There exists a preference for
leaving the ultimate decisions to the shareholders, because the interests among shareholders
have the highest degree of homogeneity.
In contrast, Blair (1996), Zingales (1998), and Blair and Stout (1999) argue that it is not in the
interest of the shareholders to be the exclusive owners of residual control. Firms exist because
they produce what are commonly called quasi-rents (Klein, Crawford and Alchian, 1978) or
synergies (Foss and Iversen, 1997). Quasi-rents represent the difference between what the
6parties inside the firm jointly generate and what each of them can obtain in the market. Quasi-
rents are the outcome of mutually specialized assets of people who make firm-specific
investments (Rajan and Zingales, 1998). These investments cannot, or only at high cost, be
protected by contracts ex ante when the parties enter into a relationship. They represent
transaction-specific investments that cause sunk costs once the contract has been made and
are subjected to hold up. What matters is that investors’ ex post bargaining position is
weakened when the quasi-rents are divided (e.g. by discussing their wages after entering the
contract). Their firm-specific investment is of little or no value outside the firm and decreases
their outside opportunities during the term of the contract. It is primarily employees who are
affected by such hold up. It has been shown empirically that employees who are forced to find
new jobs lose, on average, 15 percent of their wages (Osterman, 1999). If they were employed
in the firm for more than 21 years, they stand to lose as much as 44 percent of their wages
(Topel, 1991). As a consequence, employees have no incentive to undertake firm-specific
investments if their bargaining position is not protected after they enter into the labor contract
(Freeman and Lazear, 1996).
This critique of the view of the firm as a nexus of contracts leads to a view of the firm as a
nexus of firm-specific investments (Blair and Stout, 1999). These firm-specific investments
create room for ex post bargaining after the contracts have been finalized. For this reason,
corporate governance can be defined as a set of constraints shaping the ex post bargaining
over the joint output of firm-specific investments (Zingales, 1998). Blair and Stout (1999,
2001) claim that it is the board that has to take over the task of governing the firm-specific
investments and mediating between possible conflicting interests of investors in firm-specific
assets, which cannot be contracted ex ante. In Blair and Stout’s view, the board should act as
a neutral third party, which is not involved in firm-specific investments. It should act as an
impartial ‘mediating hierarch’ and therefore should consist mainly of outside directors. This
proposal constitutes a pioneering development in the corporate government discussion, but
7should be expanded upon.  In particular this proposal envisages voting rights only given to
shareholders, thus maintaining shareholders supremacy. As Aglietta and Reberioux (2005:40)
criticize, Blair and Stout (1999) “give voting rights to shareholders less for analytical reasons
specific to their model and more for shaping this model to fit US reality”.
2.3 THE FIRM AS A NEXUS OF KNOWLEDGE-SPECIFIC INVESTMENTS
Blair and Stout’s proposal is important but nevertheless neglects to address the crucial
differences between firm-specific investments in knowledge and physical or financial capital.
There are fundamental differences between firm-specific investments in knowledge and
physical goods. These differences are neither addressed in Blair and Stout`s proposal nor in
the proposal advanced by Aglietta and Reberioux (2005). Firstly, as far as knowledge
investments are concerned, it is not only too expensive to contract firm-specific investments
ex ante before entering a contract, but it is simply impossible. A knowledge worker cannot
contract his or her future knowledge as such due to the “knowledge paradox” highlighted by
Arrow (1973: 171): The value of knowledge invested in the potential acquirer is not known
until after the knowledge is revealed. Once revealed, the potential acquirer has no need to pay
for it.
Secondly, the generation of knowledge cannot be evaluated in the same way as physical goods
during the contract term. Only insiders or peers can evaluate firm-specific knowledge
generation and transformation, because outsiders are rarely able to comprehend the processes
involved.  Outside directors usually evaluate knowledge investments by judging the financial
consequences of knowledge encapsulated in marketable products or projects successfully
carried out. They are not able to evaluate the quality of the knowledge process itself, and are
8thus not able to protect knowledge investors from a deterioration of their bargaining position
during the interim period when joint knowledge has not yet led to a recoverable output.
Thirdly, the information asymmetry between management and outside directors leads to the
external board members being dependent on executives for information. Under present
conditions, a board dominated by outside directors has to rely largely on information provided
by the top executives. In most cases, the CEO sets the agenda for the board. Most of the
information that board members receive originated from the CEO. It seldom happens that the
board meets without the CEO’s presence (Jensen, Murphy and Wruck, 2004: 54).
All these arguments suggest that firm-specific knowledge investments are crucial for a
sustained competitive advantage for the firm – which is a widely shared view today – and
corporate governance should involve inside knowledge workers in the decision-making
process of the firms’ boards. There are two justifications. Firstly, according to the knowledge-
based view, firm-specific knowledge, in particular of a tacit nature, is the most critical
resource. Outside board members cannot understand the firm’s tacit knowledge base and its
strategic relevance (Coff, 1999:126; Barney, 2005:946). Secondly, contractual provisions
such as regulating exit, the vesting of options and repayment schemes are in most cases no
valid alternative to board representation of knowledge workers. The reason is that the
underlying conflicts between shareholders and knowledge workers concerning the
appropriation of the quasi rents appear in full force only at the level of the board where all
conflicting parties should be represented. Thus, these conflicts cannot be resolved by a human
resource manager, working at a lower level. This is in line with the definition of corporate
governance provided by Zingales (1998) cited above (see also Hart, 1995: 679). Such conflict
resolution is also in the interests of the shareholders themselves as it leads to an increase in
the value of the firm. How this can be achieved is discussed in the following section.
3. New Proposals for Corporate Governance
9The distinct characteristics of firm-specific knowledge investments justify that knowledge
workers are represented on the board. All other stakeholders, with the exception of
shareholders, are better able to form ex ante contracts and therefore need not be represented
on the board. Knowledge is indeed a special resource unlike any other resources, as
highlighted by Arrow´s (1973) knowledge paradox: All other resources can in principle be
contracted, though sometimes a high cost. This is not the case for knowledge as long as it is
not encapsulated in a marketable product. Moreover, even in this case the problem of
attributing the contribution of each worker to the product is unresolved. Thus, the knowledge
workers and the shareholders should be involved in the residual control as they carry the brunt
of the non-contractible residual risk. Contrary to what has been proposed by the dominant
view of shareholder supremacy, this leads us to propose board arrangements:
- Firstly, the board should rely more on insiders. The percentage of insiders relative to
outsiders should be determined by the relationship of firm-specific knowledge capital
to financial capital.
- Secondly, these insiders should be elected by, and responsible for, those employees of
the firm making firm-specific knowledge investments. The board should no longer be
solely an instrument of financial investors, but also an instrument of knowledge
investors, and should have the task of aligning the interests of these constituents.
- Thirdly, a neutral person should chair the board. His or her main task is to enable the
board members to engage in a productive discourse to the mutual benefit of all
members of the firm. Moreover, he or she has to ensure that the conditions are such
that the board members are prepared to contribute to the firm’s common good, and to
refrain from rent seeking.
The next subsections discuss these three proposals in more detail.
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3.1 INSIDERS ON THE BOARD
Insiders of the firm, especially those who are knowledge workers, have three major
advantages over outsiders on the board1. Firstly, they are better informed about the issues and
problems concerning the firm’s business (Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1990; Hillmann and
Dalziel, 2003), in particular they can better understand the firm´s tacit knowledge base (Coff,
1999:126). The more important the firm-specific knowledge is, and the more diversified and
decentralized the organization structure of a company is, the less knowledge is shared with
outsiders on the board about what is really going on in the firm (Child and Rodrigues, 2003).
Outside directors are able to monitor executives mainly through exerting output control, based
upon clearly defined performance targets (Ouchi, 1978). They have only limited control over
the transformation processes, which help with evaluating the performance when innovative
knowledge work is crucial. The more firms compete on the basis of innovation, the more this
applies. In times of high uncertainty and rapid change, it is no longer possible to maintain
control through targets set by hierarchical control, because targets in these cases have to be
reset at regular intervals. It follows that control has to be based on a mutually agreed, ongoing
revision of goals that are informed by new search procedures. Such a procedural control is
similar to the one commonly used in various professions. It is not possible to evaluate the
quality of performance from outside, but only from mutual monitoring on the inside. Our
proposal applies the insight of organization theory that the decision rights should be assigned
to the actors possessing relevant knowledge in the design of corporate governance (Grandori,
2004, 5).
A second important advantage of having insiders on the board is that it lessens the board’s
dependence on CEOs for supplying information. Knowledge workers as directors give the
                                                 
1 See also the empirical data reported by Lawler III and Finegold (2006). It shows that the presence of insiders in
the boardroom – in their case inside non-directors - enhances the effectiveness of boards considerably with
respect to independence, information, communication, and performance management.
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board a well-informed source of inside information not filtered by the CEOs. These inside
directors have superior explicit knowledge, as well as tacit knowledge, on the specific issues
and problems facing the firm. At the same time, insiders mitigate the problem of double
agency-relationship. The first consists of owners and management, the second of management
and employees (Child and Rodrigues, 2004). The inside directors are able to bridge the gap
between these groups.
Thirdly, it is not in the interests of outside executive directors, who are also CEOs of other
firms, to seriously challenge the policies, especially the remuneration of executives. It is well
known that outside CEOs view the board through CEO eyes, i.e. through a lens, which does
not seriously challenge the power of the CEO. For example, a study by O’Reilly et al. (1988)
found that the pay of the compensation committee members was a better predictor of CEO
compensation than the actual performance of the firm. Thus, the membership of employees in
the compensation committees would have a moderating effect upon the mutual hiking up of
compensations by the cross-board membership of outside CEOs.
The three advantages might be criticized by arguing that knowledge workers, as employees of
the firm, are subservient to the interests of the executives to whom they are subordinated in
the firm’s hierarchy. But, as we will argue in the next section, these knowledge directors gain
a measure of independence by being elected by, and responsible to, the body of knowledge
investors in the firm.
3.2 REPRESENTATION OF KNOWLEDGE INVESTORS ON THE BOARD
To solve the problem that contracts cannot be formed ex ante and that the insiders may be
subservient to the very managers whom they are supposed to control, we propose an
institutional solution: Financial and knowledge investors should be represented on the board.
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Other stakeholders and employees with no firm-specific investments are better able to
contract their contributions to the firm ex ante. Suppliers of plant equipment, for example,
normally retain the equipment as long as they have not received full payment. The claims of
employees with no firm-specific investments are also ex ante contractible via market wages.
Therefore, these groups do not need protection via representation on the board. In contrast,
the whole investment of a shareholder is placed at risk of becoming a residual claim
(Williamson, 1985). The same applies to the investors in firm-specific knowledge. To protect
them, and to give them an incentive to invest, these groups must be represented on the board.
The relationship of the two groups ought to be proportional to the relation of investment in
financial capital and investment in firm-specific knowledge capital. As a consequence, in a
firm in which firm-specific knowledge investment is very important, the board should contain
a large percentage of representatives of knowledge investors. An example are members of a
design team who make an effort to learn ‘who knows what’, so contributing to a firm-specific
transactive memory (Wegner, 1987; Moreland, 1999). In addition, they invest in developing
knowledge that complements the knowledge of other team members to raise joint output
(Coff, 1999). If such an employee has to leave the firm she has not only lost her relational
capital but cannot convincingly show to another employer what her contribution was worth.
Investing in such a way means loosing bargaining power compared to investment in general
marketable knowledge.2 In contrast, knowledge that has the same marketable value
irrespective of the firm in which it is used, should not be represented on the board. Examples
are professionals working in consultancies, accounting firms or legal companies, who often
have closer relationships to their customers than to their firm. When they decide to work for
another company, they often take their customers with them and have no sunk costs.
                                                 
2 While Coff (1999) well develops the bargaining aspects of firm-specific resources, his analysis is static. He
does not consider that employees will not invest in firm-specific resources if their bargaining power does not
protect them from hold up.
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There are several proposals for measuring knowledge capital (e.g. Bontis, 2001; Lev, 2001;
Lev and Radhakrishnan, 2003; Strassmann, 1999). To get the firm-specific investment of
employees in knowledge capital, the knowledge capital must be reduced by a factor, which,
on the one hand, captures the average reduction in wages employees of the firm would suffer
if they had to work in another firm. On the other hand, it should include the average
investment the firm has made in the knowledge of its employees. This calculation requires an
econometric analysis in which average wage rates in the firm are estimated, depending on a
set of individual characteristics of the employees, as well as a variable that measures the time
each employee spent in the firm. As an alternative to this intricate process, a firm could
voluntarily offer its employees a share of seats in the board corresponding to the
attractiveness it desires to exhibit towards potential contributors to firm specific knowledge.
Such a procedure has the advantage of being future oriented.
We suggest that each employee has voting rights, according to his or her firm-specific
investment. It ranges from zero to one. The size of this investment is captured by the
estimated individual reduction in wage an employee would sustain if he or she had to transfer
to another firm. Employees who sustain no estimated loss from having invested in their firm
specific knowledge, or who gain an estimated net profit from knowledge investments by the
firm, should have no vote. The econometric analysis to calculate individual wage reductions
or gains must include a large set of personal characteristics of the employees, as well as a
variable capturing the fact of having been an employee of the firm in question. If the
coefficient of this latter variable is negative, the employee suffers a loss due to having
invested knowledge in the firm in question. In that case, the group of employees meeting
these characteristics should have the right to vote according to the size of the coefficient
econometrically estimated. Again, the procedure can be facilitated and turned future oriented
by voluntarily offering potential contributors to firm specific knowledge the right to vote for
their representatives in the board.
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3.3 NEUTRAL CHAIR OF THE BOARD
We envisage a neutral chair, whose task it would be to guarantee an open discussion on the
board so that all aspects can be duly considered. He or she should establish, as well as they
can, what has been called an ideal speech situation (Habermas, 1987; Steinmann, 1990). In
particular, he or she has to make sure that the procedural rules are strictly observed and that
all relevant arguments are heard and considered. The chair should make an effort to secure
consensus on the board, especially when complicated issues are at stake.3 Unanimous
decisions on the board should be required for constitutional issues of the firm (Buchanan and
Tullock, 1962; Romme, 2004). The chair should also decide when, and when not, it would be
useful to have the executives partake in the meetings of the board, thus securing the board a
further measure of independence. The chair is therefore a specialist in procedures; he or she
should not have any voting rights in order to remain truly independent. This can be compared
to the task of a judge in relation to the jury.
The neutral chair of the board should be elected by the unanimous vote of its members. This
ensures ex ante neutrality and grants him or her independence vis-à-vis any special faction of
the board. Therefore, this person should be an outsider to the firm and should not be
connected to the firm through previous employment or through any other capacity. Thus, we
reject the common practice of appointing former CEOs as chairpersons of the board. 4
4. Potential Counterarguments
                                                 
3 See Nickerson and Zenger (2004), who argue that simple problems can be left to the market, while problems of
medium complexity to authority-based hierarchy and complex problems can be left to consensus-based
hierarchy.
4 We side, in this respect, with Jensen, Murphy and Wruck (2004).
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It could be argued that the proposals made on how the board should be constituted are lacking
in various respects. We discuss four potential major counterarguments.
1. Professionals tend to invest less firm-specific knowledge than other employees,
because their higher education allows them to productively use their knowledge in a
variety of firms. Higher education means that one has ‘learned to learn’, a faculty
raising flexibility and adaptation to new challenges. Moreover, professionals define
themselves to a high degree by following rules and norms developed by the respective
professional community of which they are members. These rules and norms are
specific to their particular activity and not to the firm in which they are employed.
(Scott, 1966; Larson, 1979). This allows them to keep valuable outside options open.
According to our proposal, they should not be represented on the board if they fail to
undertake any substantial firm-specific investments. This would mean that their
considerable knowledge cannot be used to counter the executives’ superior
knowledge. The board’s dependence on information from the CEOs is not solved.
This argument does not take into account that, under the present corporate governance
system, professionals have little incentive to actively bring their specialist knowledge
to a firm. But our plan to offer them representation on the board provides them with an
incentive to invest in firm-specific knowledge. As a compensation for the reduction in
valuable outside opportunities, they gain bargaining power in the firm they are
associated with. Thus, the counterargument mentioned starts from a static point of
view. In equilibrium, after certain adjustments have taken place, professionals will be
represented on the board.
2. It could be argued that a representation of knowledge investors can be achieved within
the prevailing corporate governance system. Knowledge investors can be remunerated
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by equity-based compensation, which makes them shareholders. In that capacity, they
can elect persons representing them on the board.
This argument does not take into account that such shares in stock, given to the
knowledge investing employees, must be restricted in order to hinder a coalition of
executives and inside directors from exploiting pure financial investors. Such a
coalition could provide incentives for rent seeking and ‘earnings management’, due to
the unlimited power of increasing the dependence of outside directors on accessing
information. Stock-based compensation, first and foremost, gives an incentive to
increase expectations, but not performance (Martin, 2003). A coalition of both
knowledge investors and executives being shareholders might be unbeatable in
manipulating expectations of financial investors to their own advantage.5 Financial
investors for the most part do not understand the processes of knowledge generation in
the firm. For instance, they find it difficult to evaluate the emergence and the potential
of a new technological trajectory6 in which the firm invests.
Therefore, knowledge investors owning shares must be forced to restrict any
advantages they have from insider information, at least in the same way as executives
owning shares are restricted. However, it is well known that such restrictions have
proved to be ineffective. Restrictions mean that the respective stocks are not fully
tradable and can therefore not be used as part of a risk diversification strategy. As a
consequence, they are less valuable to the individual restricted stockholder than the
cost to the firm as a means of remuneration. It is estimated that, under reasonable
conditions, individuals evaluate e.g. a standard option program to less than 60 percent
of the cost to the providing firm (Hall and Murphy, 2002; Meulbroeck, 2000).
                                                 
5 Comparable to venture capitalists during the decline of the internet boom after 1997, see Bolton, Scheinkman
and Xiong, (in press:122).
6 Technologies typically evolve along different technological trajectories ( Dosi et al, 1988; Teece, 1987).
Usually, only one of these different trajectories will emerge as the dominant design.
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3. It may be argued that our proposal is counterfactual to the trend away from insiders
in the board (Murphy and Zabojnik, 2004). This may indeed be an empirical fact but it
does not have the expected positive effects. The explosion of executive compensation
has not been halted (see e.g. Bolton, Scheinkman and Xiong, in press).  Empirical
evidence also suggests that there is no correlation between the number of outside
directors and the financial performance of the firm (Dalton et al, 2003; Hermalin and
Weisbach, 2003). The explanation for this inconsistency may be found in the disregard
of the advisory role of directors in the dominant corporate governance discussion
(Adams and Ferreira, in press; Lawler III and Finegold, 2006).  Thus the empirically
observed trend goes in the wrong direction.
4. Our plan might be criticized for having similarities to German co-determination. In
German corporations with more than 2000 employees, the board must have a 50
percent representation of the employees7. Many economists consider such a legal
imposition a sure way to reduce firm efficiency (e.g. Jensen and Meckling, 1979) or
pareto-efficiency (Freeman and Lazear, 1996). It therefore seems a bad idea to imitate
such co-determination.
Nevertheless, empirical evidence produces contradictory results. Some authors argue
that co-determination reduces efficiency (e.g. FitzRoy and Kraft, 1993), while others
find that it raises efficiency (e.g. Zwick, 2004). A comprehensive analysis of the
existing empirical literature finds neither negative nor positive effects for co-
determination on firm performance (Addison, Schnabel and Wagner, 2004). In any
case, the empirical analyses do not make a difference regarding the effect of co-
determination according to the importance of firm-specific knowledge investments.
Moreover, it is important to see that the plan here suggested is purely voluntary and
                                                 
7 The chairperson of the board, who is elected by the shareholders, has a double vote in the case of disagreement.
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should be adopted by shareholders because the self-restriction of their power is in their
enlightened self-interest (Asher, Mahoney and Mahoney, 2005).8 In contrast to our
proposal, which specifies a representation of employees according to the extent of
knowledge investment, the rigid requirements of the German co-determination law
imposes a fixed percentage of employees on the board. This regulation, in general,
produces only few knowledge investors to be represented on the board. Our plan
provides an incentive to implement knowledge investments and therefore raises the
efficiency of the firm.
5. Advantages of our Proposal
5.1 PROVIDING INCENTIVES FOR KNOWLEDGE INVESTORS
It is worth repeating our plan’s greatest strength. Employees have a stronger incentive to
become knowledge investors, i.e. to invest in firm-specific knowledge capital. This
incentive is particularly important for highly educated professionals who, under the present
corporate governance conditions, have little incentive to become more fully engaged with
the firm they are working for. Investing in firm-specific knowledge reduces their outside
options, and thus their bargaining position inside and outside of the firm.
 These missing incentives stand in sharp contrast to the emphasis on firm-specific
knowledge as the most important competitive advantage, which is hard to imitate. In
contrast, our plan provides these incentives and contributes to building up firm-specific
knowledge capital and therewith leads to sustainable efficiency rents to firms. Our
proposal helps us to overcome one important flaw of the knowledge-based theory of the
                                                 
8 In this respect we differ from Aglietta and Reberioux (2005), who call for state regulations, and do not
advocate a particular model as we do.
19
firm: This theory disregards the incentives individuals would have to generate and transfer
knowledge9.
5.2 COUNTERVAILING THE DOMINANCE OF EXECUTIVES
Insiders, who possess great familiarity with internal processes, and with internal tacit
knowledge, can monitor the executives more efficiently than outsiders can, as they are
less dependent on the information provided by the executives. In addition, their function
as representatives of the employees strengthens participation and self-governance by the
corporate community as a part of corporate governance. Anyone breaking the rules is
more easily identified by colleagues than by superiors, and can be informally admonished.
This assures that others are doing their part in contributing to the firm’s common good,
and are refraining from rent seeking. One of the most important common goods inside
companies is corporate virtue. This entails a generally shared notion of what  honesty in
business is about, and behaving correctly, even when not being watched or formally
sanctioned (Osterloh and Frey, 2004). In contrast, in the case of the corporate scandals
involving Enron and WorldCom, it is well known that the dishonest behavior of top
management was common knowledge among employees (Spector, 2003). But formal, as
well as informal, accusations of malpractice or whistle-blowing have beenthe exception
rather than the rule. External directors have neither the necessary information to reveal
misbehavior, nor are they sufficiently trusted to be approached by the employees; they are
considered to be representatives of the shareholders and, as such, perceived as opponents
rather than confederates.
    Another advantage of having insiders on the board stems from the insight that process
control performed by peers or insiders is perceived as a supportive function rather than an
                                                 
9 With regard to this criticism, see e.g. Dosi and Marengo (2000), Osterloh, Frey and Frost (2002).
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external control. As has been established by crowding theory (Frey 1997; Osterloh and
Frey 2000; Frey and Osterloh 2002, 2005), an intervention perceived as controlling
undermines intrinsic work motivation, while a procedural control by experts is perceived
as supporting (Gittell 2000) and fair (Bies and Shapiro 1988), crowding in intrinsic work
motivation.
5.3 STRENGTHENING INTRINSIC WORK MOTIVATION AND LOYALTY TO THE
FIRM BY DISTRIBUTIVE FAIRNESS
Representation of knowledge workers on the board helps to prevent their exploitation by
executives and shareholders. Many employees, in particular knowledge workers, are to a
considerable extent intrinsically motivated. In order be creative, knowledge work needs
autonomy (Amabile, 1996), which is the most important condition for becoming
intrinsically motivated (Deci and Ryan, 2000; Frey, 1997). But such intrinsic motivation
is undermined if individuals feel treated unfairly or exploited, by conditions in which
distributive justice is disregarded (Osterloh, 2005). At the same time, loyalty to superiors
and to the firm as a whole is diminished, as the literature on psychological contracts
(Rousseau, 1995) and Organizational Citizenship Behavior (OCB) impressively shows
(Organ and Ryan, 1995). To ensure that distributive fairness can be exercised, the
respective authorities must be able to judge who has contributed what to the body of firm-
specific knowledge and must be represented in the top decision making unit, the board. As
already argued, external directors are not in the position to perform this job. They
normally cannot judge the quantity and quality of knowledge work itself. They are only
able to evaluate the financial effects of knowledge encapsulated in marketable products or
projects carried out successfully. Only participants in the knowledge process – who must
therefore be inside knowledge workers and peers – stand a good chance of successfully
performing this job and being perceived as acceptable evaluators by their colleagues.
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5.4 STRENGTHENING INTRINSIC WORK MOTIVATION AND LOYALTY TO THE
FIRM BY PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS
Individuals’ intrinsic work motivation depends largely on perceived procedural, and not
only on distributive fairness (Tyler and Blader, 2003; Frey, Benz and Stutzer, 2004).
Moreover, following rules of fairness signals a commitment towards partners in joint
production. This creates a framing effect signaling a partial suspension of gain driven
behavior (Lindenberg, 2002; 2004). Our proposal entails an institutional safeguard for
procedural fairness in the form of an outsider, not involved in firm-specific investment
constituting a neutral chair. This person, elected unanimously by all other members of the
board, without any voting rights on the board, has the function of an impartial mediator.
He or she is institutionally safeguarded against being subjected to the ‘self-serving bias’.
Even honest people can fall prey to this unconscious bias, which conflates judgments on
what constitutes fairness and what is beneficial for oneself. Unlike conscious corruption,
such conflation cannot be deterred by sanctions (Babcock and Loewenstein, 1997;
Bazerman, Loewenstein and Moore, 2002). However, it can be reduced, by lowering the
incentives to take care of one’s own interests. This is exactly what the institution of a
neutral chair of the board ensures and what makes him or her a credible mediator for the
shareholders, knowledge workers and executives alike.
5.5 ENSURING DIVERSITY ON THE BOARD WHILE LOWERING TRANSACTION
COSTS
The neutral chair has a second important function on the board. On the one hand,
representation by shareholders and knowledge workers ensures that a multitude of different
aspects are represented on the board. Such diversity is important for making wise strategic
decisions, in particular in diversified and decentralized organizational structures (Child and
Rodrigues, 2003). On the other hand, diversity of interests and control rights also raises the
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transaction costs of the decision-making process on the board (Hansmann, 1996), a
disadvantage which needs to be counterbalanced by the advantages of having diversity. The
neutral chairperson, as a specialist in procedures or a ‘facilitator’ (Grandori, 2001), is able to
find generally acceptable solutions to conflicting issues.
6. Conclusions
The dominant view of corporate governance does not sufficiently take into consideration that
a modern corporation’s key task is to generate, accumulate and transfer firm-specific
knowledge. It does not differentiate between firms producing in a traditional way, based on
physical work, and firms relying mainly on knowledge work.
This paper argues in contrast that the importance of firm-specific knowledge has to be taken
into account. Firm-specific knowledge investments are the essential basis for a sustainable
competitive advantage. Financial and knowledge investments must be combined to produce
what are commonly called synergies or quasi rents. As a consequence, these quasi rents need
to be divided in a way perceived to fair by the participants. In particular, knowledge investors
should not feel exploited, otherwise they will refuse to make firm-specific investments, and
will prefer to make investments in outside options. Corporate governance must secure their ex
post bargaining position, once the (necessarily incomplete) labor contracts have been fixed. It
is the board that has to take over this task.
With this end in mind, this paper advances three specific proposals:
1. The board should rely much more on insiders. The percentage of insiders relative to
outsiders should be determined by the relationship of firm-specific knowledge capital
to financial capital.
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2. The insiders are to be elected by, and responsible for, those employees of the firm
making firm-specific knowledge investments.
3. The board is to be chaired by a neutral person, whose main task is to facilitate the
board members engagement in a productive discourse, which mutually benefits all
members of the firm. The chairperson also has to make sure that the board members
are prepared to contribute to the firm’s common good and refrain from rent seeking.
While arguments may be raised against these proposals, they have the following major
advantages over the reform suggested by the dominant corporate governance approach. With
respect to corporate governance design, our proposals provide incentives for knowledge
investors; they countervail the dominance of executives; they strengthen intrinsic work
motivation and loyalty to the firm by distributive as well as procedural justice; and they
ensure diversity on the board while lowering transaction costs. With respect to corporate
governance theory, our approach takes into account insights offered by organization theory,
namely that multi-party decisions, and even conflicting interests, might be costly but can
improve the quality of decisions (Grandori, 2005). Moreover, our approach overcomes the
separation of theories focusing on value generation or distribution criticized by Asher,
Mahoney and Mahoney (2005). We combine the knowledge-based theory of the firm,
focusing on producing a sustained competitive advantage on the one hand, with property
rights theory focusing on the distribution of residual claims on the other hand. We thus hope
to provide a step in the direction of a more adequate theory of the firm as a basis for corporate
governance.
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